Landmark Judgment on Gender Equality in the Indian Army's JAG Branch.


In a significant ruling on August 11, 2025, the Supreme Court of India addressed a writ petition concerning gender-based discrimination in the recruitment process for the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch of the Indian Army. The case, titled Arshnoor Kaur & Another v/s The Union Of India & Others, challenged a notification that allotted more vacancies to male candidates than female candidates, despite the female petitioners having higher merit rankings.

The Core of the Dispute:

The primary issue at the heart of the case was whether the Union of India could restrict the number of women inducted into the JAG branch after having issued a notification permitting their entry under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950. The impugned notification for the JAG Scheme 31st Course allocated six vacancies for men and only three for women. The petitioners, Arshnoor Kaur and Astha Tyagi, ranked 5th and 4th respectively among women candidates, both with higher scores than a male candidate who was selected, argued that this policy was unconstitutional and violated their right to equality.

 

 

Arguments Presented:

The petitioners’ counsel, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, contended that the selection criteria were identical for both male and female candidates, and the Ministry of Defence had affirmed that employment in the armed forces is "gender-neutral" with no distinction in testing or working conditions. He asserted that reserving additional seats for men in public employment is not permissible and violates Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before the law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The counsel argued that a gender-neutral policy should lead to a single, combined merit list based purely on marks.

In response, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the Additional Solicitor General, argued that the determination of vacancies is based on the functional and operational requirements of the Army, and that all JAG officers are considered combatants. She referenced a policy from March 14, 2012, stating that women officers are not posted in frontline combat zones where they might encounter enemies. She also cited Article 33 of the Constitution, which allows Parliament to modify fundamental rights for members of the armed forces.

The Court’s Reasoning and Conclusion:

The court’s judgment centered on the interpretation of the Constitution and the Army Act, 1950. It acknowledged that Parliament has the power to restrict fundamental rights for armed forces members under Article 33, but emphasized that any such restriction must be made by law. The court concluded that while the Union of India can allow the induction of women under Section 12 of the Army Act, it cannot then restrict their numbers through an administrative policy or instruction. The judgment stated that the impugned notification, which reserved double the number of vacancies for males, was unconstitutional. The court also found that the argument about JAG officers being primarily combatants was misconceived and that the policy of limiting women’s employment was baseless and not supported by empirical data.

As a result of its findings, the Supreme Court issued a directive to the Union of India. It mandated that all future recruitment for the JAG branch must be conducted with a single, common merit list for all candidates, regardless of their gender. The court further directed that the merit list and the marks obtained by all candidates in the selection process be made public. In its final remarks, the court affirmed its role as an enforcer of the Constitution and stated its agreement with the view that "no nation can be secure, when half of its population (i.e. its women force) is held back". This landmark ruling reinforces the principle of gender equality and a merit-based approach within the armed forces.


Section 12, Army Act - 1950  

Army Act, 1950  

Constitution of India, 1950