In a recent and compelling judgment of Sanjit Singh Salwan & Others v/s Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan & Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered a powerful message about the fundamental principles of estoppel and the impermissibility of a party to "blow hot and cold" in legal proceedings. The Court, in this case, set aside the orders of the Commercial Court and the High Court, which had declared an arbitral award a nullity. The core of the Supreme Court's reasoning rested on the principle that a party's conduct in a previous stage of litigation can prevent them from taking a contradictory position later, especially when the other party has acted to their detriment based on that conduct.
The Inconsistent Positions of the Parties:
The case revolved around a dispute between two groups claiming to be trustees of the Guru Tegh Bahadur Charitable Trust. The respondents had initially filed a civil suit to restrain the appellants from interfering with the trust’s affairs. Critically, the respondents themselves had argued in their plaint that the suit was not barred by Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), a provision dealing with suits relating to public trusts.
However, the trial court disagreed and rejected the plaint, citing the bar under Section 92 CPC. The respondents then appealed this decision. During the appeal, a significant turn of events occurred: both parties agreed to appoint a sole arbitrator to resolve their disputes. An arbitral award was subsequently passed, and in a joint application, both parties informed the appellate court that they had accepted the award and would abide by it. The appellate court, in a consent decree, disposed of the appeal in terms of this award. This decree was never challenged and attained finality.
The conflict re-emerged when the respondents allegedly failed to fulfill their obligations under the consent decree. The appellants sought to enforce the decree by filing an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim measures. It was at this point that the respondents took a dramatic and contradictory stand. They argued that the arbitral award was a nullity because the disputes, relating to a public trust, were non-arbitrable under Section 92 CPC. The Commercial Court and the High Court accepted this argument, leaving the appellants without a remedy.
Approbation and Reprobation: A Legal Bar
The Supreme Court, however, took a different view. It framed the central issue as a matter of estoppel by conduct and election, rather than a simple question of estoppel against law. The Court observed that the respondents' actions demonstrated a clear pattern of "approbation and reprobation," or "blowing hot and cold." They had initially argued that their suit was not barred by Section 92 CPC, a stance that allowed them to proceed with the arbitration and secure a consent decree. Once they had obtained this advantage, they could not be permitted to turn around and argue the exact opposite to defeat the enforcement of that same decree.
The Court relied on several precedents to reinforce this principle. The decision in Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport highlighted that a litigant cannot "change and choose its stand to suit its convenience." The maxim qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate) was central to the Court's reasoning.
The Court also referenced the judgment in Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, which established that while there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law, a party can be estopped from disputing facts that they had previously asserted, leading another party to alter their position to their detriment. In this case, the respondents' acceptance of the arbitral award and the subsequent consent decree induced the appellants to act on its terms, including withdrawing legal proceedings. This conduct was sufficient to raise the bar of estoppel against the respondents.
A Path to Justice:
The Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts had erred by focusing solely on the legal issue of non-arbitrability without giving due weight to the respondents' conduct and the unchallenged consent decree. The Court found that allowing the respondents to succeed on their inconsistent plea would result in a grave injustice to the appellants, leaving them without any remedy despite a final decree in their favor.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and restored the appellants' right to seek execution of the consent decree. The Court allowed the appellants to revive the execution proceedings they had previously withdrawn, ensuring that their legal recourse was not completely shut down.
This judgment serves as a significant reminder that the legal process is not a "game of chess" where parties can adopt inconsistent positions at will. It underscores the importance of legal coherence and the equitable principle that a party's prior conduct can bind them, preventing them from using a legal technicality to escape their obligations. The ruling reaffirms that justice is not just about the law in isolation but also about upholding fairness and preventing parties from taking undue advantage through their own contradictory actions.
Section 92., Code of Civil Procedure - 1908
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
